This article analyzes the effect of religious affiliation on fertility in Japan, Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan). It adds to the sparse empirical evidence on the effects of religious affiliation on fertility in East Asia, for both Abrahamic and other religions. It uses an identity-economic model and analyzes prescriptions among the different religions to derive testable hypotheses about the effect of religions on fertility. In the empirical section, the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) and a generalized Poisson model are used to estimate the effects of different religions on fertility. In line with theoretical predictions, the empirical results suggest that the positive effect of Catholicism on fertility that has disappeared in both Europe and the US in past decades is still present in East Asia. In line with the sparse previous empirical evidence on Buddhism, it seems to have no effect on fertility.
Introduction
There is quite a substantial amount of research on the fertility effects of different religions, analysing the effects of Judaism and different Christian denominations, and using data from the US and Europe. Usually, these studies find that there used to be a pronounced difference between Catholics and Protestants in the past, with the former having had much higher fertility rates, but that this difference has all but disappeared. At the same time, these studies also usually find that fertility rates among Jewish Americans are much lower. See, for example, Lehrer (1996) for an overview. Different norms among the religions are often cited as the explanation for these differences in behaviour (e.g., the anticontraception stance of the Vatican as the reason for higher fertility among Catholics in the past).
Much less is known about the possible fertility effects of other religions, and of the fertility effects of the Christian religions in other regions. The aim of my article is to close part of this research gap by adding to the sparse previous literature. Firstly, it analyses the possible fertility effects of Christian religions in East Asian countries and compares their effects to those reported in the previous literature on fertility effects of Christian religions in Western countries. Secondly, it analyses the possible effects of other religions, especially Buddhism, on fertility behaviour in East Asian countries, and compares the results to those reported in the previous literature. Finally, it also analyses the effect of having a traditional attitude on fertility.
For the empirical analysis, I use the 2006 wave of the East Asian Social
Study (EASS) and data for Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan), countries well known for their ultra-low fertility rates ). Because of the one-child policy and related population control policies and lack of freedom of religion in the PR China, I did not use the data on China. Fertility is measured as the number of children born to married women in their first marriage, with two additional robustness checks. The first one limits this sample to women above age 45 who should have completed their fertility decisions, and the second one uses the respondent's ideal number of children as a dependent variable to take into account possible differences between intended and actual fertility. Estimation results suggest that being Catholic is associated with higher fertility in these three countries, while there are no effects for being Buddhist or Protestant, and no effects of having a traditional attitude either. Being a follower of other Christian religions is associated with significantly lower fertility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, I give a brief discussion of theoretical considerations, and in section 4, I describe the data set used for the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses estimation results, while Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
East Asia's ultra-low fertility rates are a well-known empirical fact and have been the focus of much research on causes and on policies to increase fertility (see, for example, or Suzuki 2013 . Some of the reasons discussed in the literature include the trend to marry later or to remain single (Jones and Gubhaju 2009) , the high costs of education per child which prevent couples from having more than one or two children (Anderson and Kohler 2013 for the case of Korea), or institutional features of married life which become less and less attractive compared to living as a single with one's parents, especially for women (Bumpass et al. 2009 for the case of Japan). Those well-documented low fertility rates and their underlying causes should be seen as the background for the following discussion of previous relevant literature on the effect of religion on fertility. I restrict the following literature review to the few studies which also focus on non-Christian religions and/or on non-Western countries, but exclude studies dealing with Muslim-Hindu differences, as there are neither Muslims nor Hindus in the dataset for the three countries under consideration. 1 For an overview of results for the United States, see Lehrer (2004) and Zhang (2008) , and for a comparison of results from Europe and the United States, see Frejka and Westoff (2008) .
McQuillan (2004) provides a useful starting point for understanding the conditions under which religion affects fertility using case studies. He shows that religion matters for fertility when the religion actually has norms that guide fertility behaviour, when the religion is able to enforce these norms and to communicate them to members, and when members' religious affiliation matters greatly in their daily lives. When these three conditions are not met, it is unlikely that religious affiliation matters for fertility. This article can help to explain why results for the effects of religion on fertility vary widely for different countries and different religions, as the following results show.
In the following paragraph, I summarize results from previous studies that focus on the effect of Buddhism before turning to the effects of the Abrahamic religions in non-Western countries. For the effects of Buddhism on fertility, Knodel et al. (1999) analyse differences between Buddhist and Muslim fertility in Thailand and find that Buddhists have experienced a more significant fertility transition than Muslims, i.e. they have lower fertility rates. De la Croix and Delavallade (2014) use micro-level data from South East Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and find that being Buddhist increases fertility compared to being religiously unaffiliated. Kojima (2014) , however, uses data from the "Survey on Comparative Study of Family Policies in East Asia: South Korea, Singapore and Japan" and finds widely different results for the effects of Buddhism on the number of children, using separate samples for men and women aged 20 to 49 in the three countries. Buddhism has no effect on fertility in Japan and in Singapore, but is found to increase the probability of at least having 3 children for Korean men, compared to having 2 children. Skirbekk et al. (2015) analyse the effect of Buddhism on fertility in Cambodia, India, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, and Thailand. Controlling for a host of background variables, they find that Buddhism is not related to or significantly decreases fertility, except in Cambodia. Interestingly enough, the percentages of Buddhists among the population vary widely in the countries that they analyse, suggesting that the effect does not depend on minority o majority status of the religion. The summarized scarce empirical evidence for the possible effects of Buddhism on fertility shows widely different results for different countries and samples.
For the Abrahamic religions in non-Western countries, de la Croix and Delavallade (2014) find that being Catholic, Muslim or Protestant increases fertility compared to being religiously unaffiliated, but that there is no such effect for Hinduism. Kojima (2014) finds that for Catholicism and Protestantism, there are no effects on fertility in Korea and Singapore. Singaporean Muslims, however, are found to have significantly more children. Heaton (2011) uses data from 30 developing countries and compares Catholic, Muslim and Protestant fertility behaviour. He finds substantial differences between Muslim and Christian fertility rates in many countries, with Muslims having higher fertility, but only small differences between Catholics and Protestants and concludes that those differences vary widely between the countries included in his sample, leaving large parts of the variation unexplained by his regression models. Those results point to a positive fertility effect of being Muslim, compared to the religiously unaffiliated, while the results for the Christian religions are less clear-cut.
Again, the theoretical model by McQuillan (2004) might explain the mixed previous evidence for the effects of religion on fertility in the existing literature.
While all of the analysed religions have prescriptions on fertility, their capability of communicating them to members and enforcing them, as well as individual importance, might differ. Varying degrees of enforcement (capability) from religious institutions and individual differences in the importance of religion in general or their fertility-related prescriptions in the studies cited above might be able to explain the mixed evidence for the effects of religions on fertility.
While this article cannot control for all of these factors either, it has at least two advantages over previous research. Firstly, it uses a sample of three countries that, despite important differences, share the cultural influence of Confucianism, and where its principles are still present in everyday life (Chang 1997 , Tu 1996 , so the possible confounding effects of other cultural influences should be smaller.
Secondly, it uses additional information on an individual's traditional attitudes that might matter for fertility decisions as well, but have not been analyzed in the previous literature.
As this section has shown, there are no established conclusions for the impact of religion on fertility yet, and the amount of research dedicated to nonAbrahamic religions, such as Buddhism, is relatively small, indicating the need for more research on the topic. In the next section, I will outline a theoretical framework and analyse the different religions' prescriptions with respect to fertility to derive testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced the concept of identity into economic theory, and show how identity, or an individual's sense of self, matters for economic outcomes. The model assumes that identity depends on an individual's assigned social category, such as religion, how the individual's characteristics match that category's ideals, and how the individual's and other society members' actions correspond to the set of behaviours for the assigned category. In this utility function, aj denotes the vector of one's own actions, a-j denotes the vector of other society members' actions, and Ij denotes an individual's identity.
Theoretical considerations
Our action aj of interest is the decision to have children.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that having children increases utility through two channels: a children-derived utility component and an identity-derived utility component. The children-derived utility component contains the 'joy of parenting' that might increase individual utility. Let aj denote this utility component.
The identity-derived component affects utility through approval or disapproval from individuals of the same social category (a-j), but also through Ij if an individual acts in accordance with his or her identity.
In addition, an individual's identity Ij might also affect utility. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) specify identity as follows:
Here, cj denotes the vector of the individual's assigned social categories, P denotes prescriptions, and εj denotes the individual's own characteristics. In the case of religion, individuals might choose cj, which could refer to a religion, but also to a certain school of thought within a religion, or the intensity of their religious participation. For the prescriptions P, again, there might be differences in the way believers interpret the prescriptions of their faith, or how they interact with an individual's own characteristics εj, or how intensely those prescriptions are communicated and enforced within a religious community. This might depend on characteristics and structure of the community, their religious leaders, and a host of other determinants. It might also depend on the majority/minority status of a religion, with implications for fertility behaviour again depending on a host of other factors. McQuillan (2004) provides several case studies of the impact of both Catholicism and Islam on fertility that can explain some of the widely differing results in previous research.
While an analysis of individuals' identity and the role it plays for their fertility decisions would be highly interesting, it would also require a wealth of individuallevel and community-level data that is, unfortunately, not available in the EASS, and probably interviews would be a better suited research method. In this research, I therefore assume a representative believer who maximizes utility Uj and have to abstract from possible determinants related to identity discussed in this paragraph.
All individuals choose whether to have children or not. As the prescription to do so, or to have many children, should on average be much stronger among believers of certain religions, those should have stronger incentives to have children, compared to non-believers. Non-believers' social norms do not include the prescription to have many children, so they should have less incentives to have children. Buddhism is characterized by a number of different schools of thought (Barnhart 2009 ) which results in a limited number of sources that can be used to derive the faith's prescriptions on matters related to fertility . W h i l e t h e r e a r e important differences between the three branches of Buddhism that emerged during the faith's expansion from India throughout Asia, there are also basic elements that are shared by all its branches and schools of thought (Barnhart 2009 ). As Barnhart (2009) suggests, the Sigalavada Sutra ('Discourse to Sigala ') contains what could be seen 'a set of possible Buddhist "family values"'. According to his analysis of the Sigalavada Sutra, there is a strong focus on reciprocity in relationships within the family, but nothing that suggests it is a couple's duty to have children in the first place, or to avoid action that would prevent conception or birth. However, there are also other opinions. Keown (1995) argues that traditional Buddhism condemns abortion, citing the importance of the first of the Five Precepts in Buddhism that forbids killing. This point of view, however, contrasts with Buddhist practice in Japan. As Barnhart (2009) discusses, infanticide (mabiki) during famines was almost never condemned by Buddhist authorities, and rituals developed for parents to apologize for abortions, using the notion of 'water child' (mizuku kuyo), an idea that at conception, the embryo lacks conscience and needs time to fully develop into life, opening up the possibility that this life "is reversible without prejudice to the possibility of reforming and re-emerging at a later time" (Barnhart 2009 ). As the previous paragraph has shown, despite the diversity of Buddhist tradition and schools of thought, the lack of any pro-natalist prescriptions means that one would expect no differences between Buddhists and the religiously unattached with respect to fertility.
Information on respondents' religion in the EASS
The Catholic Church probably has the most clearly pronounced prescriptions on fertility among all the religions analysed in this article. However, there often seem to be misconceptions about the religion's teachings related to fertility. While it is true that the Catholic Church sees children as the "supreme gift of marriage" (Catechism 2002), firmly opposes abortion and any contraception method besides natural family planning, including the Billings method, it also teaches that the number of a children that a married couple have is solely their own decision, spouses can space the birth of their children (Richards 2009 ) and there is no duty or prescription to have many children whatsoever. Therefore, one might expect a positive effect of being Catholic on fertility, but this positive effect should not be too big.
Protestantism as the second Christian religion is characterized by less unified prescriptions, as there are a large number of different denominations within the faith. A broad distinction could be made between ecumenical and exclusivist Protestants, following Kelley (1972) . The Anglican Church stated in its 1958
Lambeth conference that "parents had the God-given moral responsibility for deciding upon the number and frequency of children" (Creighton 2009 Other Protestant denominations, including Pentecostal and other exclusivist groups, are less unified in their views on contraception, with many of them leaving it "up to the consciences of individual members of their congregations to decide for themselves" (Thomas 2012) or firmly opposing contraception and abortion (Lehrer 1996) . Therefore, one might not expect any differences between Protestants as a whole and the religiously unattached with respect to fertility.
While there is a huge diversity, there are also some common traits of Chinese traditional belief systems (such as the "Other Eastern religions" in the EASS) with respect to livelihood and fertility, based on Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. In Chinese folk belief systems, sons are strongly preferred to daughters because sons continue the family line, can perform ancestor worship and are traditionally the ones who are responsible for taking care of their parents (Lee et al. 2009 ). An ideal family should have many children, even though daughters are traditionally seen only as temporary family members because they will become members of their husband's family upon marriage (Lee et al. 2009 ). One might therefore expect a positive effect of following "Other Eastern religions" on fertility, and especially a strong preference for sons.
Despite important differences between the East Asian countries, t h e i r
traditional values are all deeply influenced by Confucian thought (Chang 1997) , and Confucian principles are still present in everyday life (Tu 1996) . The cultures of East Asia place a special emphasis on the family (Lee 1989) , with resulting strong prescriptions to marry and continue the family line by having sons. This emphasis is an implication of filial piety, one of the five human relations in Confucian thought. According to Mencius, the most important Confucian philosopher after Confucius himself, it is the worst crime against filial piety to not leave any posterity (Tang 1995) . Similarly to the traditional Chinese belief systems, one might therefore expect a strong preference for sons, however, not necessarily an effect on overall fertility rates. One could, however, expect an effect on overall fertility rates if parents keep on trying for a son after having girl(s) and cannot or do not want to rely on sex-selective abortion. In the empirical analysis, I briefly discuss estimation results including the sex of children as a possible determinant of fertility.
The following table summarizes the expected relationship between religious affiliation and fertility for the religions contained in the EASS. For "Other Christian religions" and "Other Religions", it is impossible to derive hypotheses about their effects because of the diversity of religions that those groups contain. Finally, the EASS does not contain information on religious upbringing, but just on current religious affiliation. As religion can be seen as a choice and there might be the possibility that, for example, individuals self-select themselves into religions, the effects reported here might not necessarily reflect a causal relationship between religion and the number of children. These limitations of the data set should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. In order to capture the possible effects of religion on the number of children born to a woman, I included a set of dummy variables that take the value of 1 if a respondent belongs to a certain religion.
The EASS also contains eighteen questions on individuals' attitudes towards marriage in general (e.g. "It is all right for a couple to live together without intending to get married", gender roles (e.g., "A husband's job is to earn money, a wife's job is to look after the home and family"), relationships inside the family (e.g., "The authority of father in a family should be respected under any circumstances"), and filial piety (e.g., "Children must make efforts to do something that would bring honour to their parents") on a scale from 1 to 7 ("strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"). All questions can be found in Appendix 1. Using these questions, I
construct an index to determine which individuals are traditionalist and which are non-traditionalist. Respondents are considered to be traditionalist if they answered with the most extreme category to more than two of the statements, which is the case for approximately 31% of the total sample. 2
In the next paragraphs, I discuss some descriptive features of the data set.
The first table shows religious affiliation in the entire sample and for the three different countries. It should be kept in mind, however, that some of the categories contain only few observations and it remains to be tested if differences also persist in regressions that control for more possible impact factors on fertility. The following section presents those estimation results.
Estimation strategy and results
As the number of children born to a woman is a nonnegative integer, count data methods are a natural choice for regression analysis. In line with previous research, I included the following control variables in the estimations: age, age at marriage, own and spouse's education (in years), number of siblings, if it is the spouse's first marriage, place of residence (countryside or big city, with those in medium-sized cities as the reference category), and family income. In order to control for the respondent's general financial situation, I included a set of 9 dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the respondent belongs to the second up to the tenth decile of the respective country's income distribution respectively, with the first (lowest) income decile being the reference category.
As the data set consists of respondents in three different countries, I include a control variable for their country of residence. The reference category is Japan, and I included two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the respondent lives in Korea or in Taiwan, respectively.
The following table reports regression results from generalized Poisson regressions. All estimations were carried out using Stata 13.1 and the user-written module gpoisson (Harris et al. 2012 ). Notes: The dependent variable is the number of children born to a w o m a n . Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The first column reports results for the entire sample, the next three columns report results for separate analyses for the three different countries. The last two rows provide additional regression results for two other analyses. The first one (reported in the fourth row) limits the analysis to women who are over 45 years old and therefore should have completed their fertility decisions. The second one (reported in the fifth row) is for the determinants of the ideal number of children of the respondent.
The reference person is religiously unaffiliated, lives in Japan, lives in a mediumsized city, and has a household income in the lowest decile of the income distribution of the respective country of residence.
The regression results for the entire sample (reported in the first column) suggest that there are effects of religious affiliation on fertility in the sample analysed here.
Being Catholic is associated with a significant increase in the number of children born to a woman, while being a follower of other Christian religions (a category only used in Japan) is associated with a significant decrease. There are no statistically significant effects for any of the other religions, neither are there any effects of traditional attitudes. In the separate regressions for the three countries, the positive effect of being Catholic on fertility disappears, which might be explained by lack of statistical power in smaller samples.
In the third section of this article, I derived hypotheses about the expected effects of different religions on fertility. The estimation results are in line with the hypotheses derived for Catholics, where I expected a moderate positive effect on fertility, and for Protestants, Buddhists and traditional attitudes, where I expected no effects on fertility, but not in line with the predictions about the effects of Other Eastern Religions, where I expected a positive effect on fertility. A very surprising result is the finding that being a follower of "other Christian religions", a category only used in Japan, significantly decreases fertility. Selection effects might explain this finding, but without more detailed information about the religions included in this category, it is impossible to analyze its reasons in more detail.
These empirical results contrast with previous research results from the US that find no difference in fertility patterns between Catholics and (mainstream)
Protestants anymore (Lehrer 2008) . Compared to the scarce previous literature on the effects of non-Christian religions, the results here contradict those of de la
Croix and Delavallade (2014) who find that religious affiliation increases fertility.
For Protestants, they are similar to the findings Kojima (2014) reports for Protestants, but contradict his results for Catholics. They confirm the earlier findings of Skirbekk et al. (2015) , who find either no effect or a decreasing effect of Buddhism on fertility. McQuillan's (2004) research might provide an explanation for these widely differing results: while it is possible to analyse religion's prescriptions with respect to fertility and check for the existence of pro-natalist norms, the first condition that he states for religion to matter for fertility outcomes, it is more difficult to empirically assess his second and third condition, namely, that the religion needs institutions to enforce and communicate its prescriptions, and that In Appendix 3, I also present results for the same regressions including information on children's gender. Those results suggest that having a girl as the first child is associated with higher fertility, and this result seems to be driven by the respondents in Taiwan, with no such effect in Japan and Korea.
The regression results for separate regressions from the three countries in the sample reveal some interesting differences between them. Being very traditional is associated with having more children in Korea, but not in the other two countries. In Japan, being affiliated with other Christian religions is associated with lower fertility and being affiliated with other Eastern religions is associated with higher fertility. In Taiwan, there are no effects for religious affiliation or traditional attitudes on fertility.
The result that more educated women have fewer children seems to be driven by the respondents from Taiwan, while there is no such relationship in Japan and Korea. Those living in a big city only have fewer children in Japan and
Korea, but not in Taiwan.
Finally, results on the determinants of the ideal number of children for a family were included to analyse possible differences between intended and actual fertility outcomes. Again, being Catholic is associated with a higher ideal number of children, while being a follower of other Christian religions is associated with a lower ideal number of children. With respect to income, those in the second and fourth decile of the respective income distribution have significantly lower values for the ideal number of children. Finally, Taiwanese women have significantly lower values than Japanese women, with no difference for Korean women.
Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, I analysed if there are differences in fertility between followers of different religions in East Asian countries, namely, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In line with the theoretical predictions for the effects of different religions derived using an identity-economic model and different religions' fertility-related predictions, there seem to be positive effects of being Catholic and no effects for being There are several limitations to the present study that should be kept in mind. First of all, the spouse's religious affiliation might affect fertility outcomes, especially if it is a heterogamous marriage between followers of different religions (Lehrer 1996) . However, the lack of information on the spouse's affiliation in the EASS makes it impossible to control for this possibility. Secondly, the questions about religious affiliation in the EASS are very broad, including possibly many different schools of thought and denominations for some religions, especially for Buddhists, Protestants, Other Christian and Other Eastern Religions. This fact might bias the results. In order to improve further research on the topic, it would be desirable to include more detailed questions on actual denominations or schools of thought for Protestants, Buddhists and Other Eastern Religions in questionnaires of the EASS, and to allow for the possibility that respondents follow more than one religion at the same time. Thirdly, the EASS does not contain information on religious upbringing, but just on current religious affiliation. As religion can be seen as a choice and there might be the possibility that, for example, individuals selfselect themselves into certain religions, also based on possible identity gains from doing so, the effects reported here might not reflect a causal relationship between religion and the number of children. However, it is difficult to think about instrumental variables or (quasi-) natural experiments to overcome this problem. 
